Broadcast Transmission, Signal Secrecy And Gestural Primacy Hypothesis by Wacewicz, Sławomir & Żywiczyński, Przemysław
 
BROADCAST TRANSMISSION, SIGNAL SECRECY AND 
GESTURAL PRIMACY HYPOTHESIS 
SŁAWOMIR WACEWICZ & PRZEMYSŁAW ŻYWICZYŃSKI 
Department of English, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Fosa Staromiejska 3 
Toruń, 87-100, Poland 
In current literature, a number of standard lines of evidence reemerge in support of the 
hypothesis that the initial, “bootstrapping” stage of the evolution of language was 
gestural. However, one specific feature of gestural communication consistent with this 
hypothesis has been given surprisingly little attention. The visual modality makes 
gestural signals more secret than vocal signals (lack of broadcast transmission). The high 
relevance of secrecy is derived from the fundamental constraint on language evolution: 
the transfer of honest messages itself is a form of cooperation, and therefore not a 
naturally evolutionarily stable strategy. Consequently, greater secrecy of gestural 
communication constitutes a potentially important factor that should not fail to be 
represented in more comprehensive models of the emergence of protolanguage.  
 
The idea of gestural primacy (in the evolution of language), in its various forms, 
has attracted numerous modern supporters (Hewes 1973, Armstrong et al. 1994, 
Corballis 2002, among many others), as well as several sceptics (e.g. 
MacNeilage & Davis 2005), with a small but notable minority denouncing it as a 
non-issue (Bickerton 2005). Its proponents adduce a wide range of evidence, 
focussing on the rigidity of preexisting primate vocal communication, iconicity 
of gestures, sign language acquisition, cortical control of the hand, and many 
others. However, one very interesting feature of gestural signals, the greater 
potential secrecy resulting from the lack of broadcast transmission, has so far 
remained unexplored, despite its strict relevance to the evolutionary context. At 
the same time, we have found it to be neglected in standard psychological, 
linguistic, and ethological approaches to nonverbal communication in humans 




1.    Definitions and caveats 
It is important to voice a number of caveats at the outset. Firstly, we follow 
Hewes (1996) in giving the pivotal term gesture a relatively broad interpretation. 
In the present context, “gestures” are primarily defined as the voluntary 
communicative movements of the arm, hand and fingers. Somewhat less 
centrally, they also include elements of proxemics, posture and orientation, facial 
expressions, and gaze direction. On the other hand, gestures as understood here 
do not refer to the articulatory gestures involved in speech production, nor to 
non-intentional bodily signals (affective gestures), although they may form a 
continuum with the latter. 
Secondly, it must be emphasised that the present paper deals specifically 
with the very earliest stage of the phylogenetic emergence of languagelike 
communication. We subscribe to the widely held position that language as 
known today was preceded by a “simpler” protolanguage. We remain 
noncommittal as to the exact nature of protolanguage (e.g. holistic versus 
atomic), but assume it to be distinguished by the lack of generative syntax, but 
the presence of the conventional sign (sensu Zlatev et al. 2005). 
Thirdly, it should be noted that this text concerns broadcast transmission 
only with respect to its consequences to secrecy (“privacy”, “addressee 
discrimination”). The general implications of broadcast transmission of a 
communication system are much wider, including such aspects as independence 





2.    The fundamental constraint on the evolution of communication 
A standard, intuitive approach to explaining the absence of language in 
nonhuman primates is to look to their cognitive, conceptual or physical 
limitations (relative to humans). Such a position implicitly assumes a natural 
motivation to exchange honest messages, only held back by the lack of suitable 
means of expression. This, in turn, is rooted in an intuitive view on the 
naturalness of cooperation, additionally backed up by the group selectionist 
mindset popular in the first half of the past century. From that perspective, the 
                                                          
1  It is worth noting that once the argument becomes framed in terms of the advantages of one 
transmission channel over the other (as is often the case), it instantly loses its relevance to the 
issue of gestural primacy. The question of which communication system is more efficient is 
logically independent from the question of which communication system is more natural to evolve 
in an ancestral primate: “which is better” is fully dissociable from “which came first”. 
 
presence of extensive cooperation between nonkin in humans is expected; it is 
the lack of such cooperation in other primates that becomes the theoretical 
problem in want of an explanation. 
 The above explanatory pattern has been reversed by the introduction 
into evolutionary theory of the gene’s eye view (Dawkins 1976) and game-
theoretic logic (Maynard Smith 1982). However, the relation between 
cooperation and communication remains complicated, with communication 
often seen essentially as a mere means for establishing the cooperative behaviour 
proper (e.g. Gärdenfors 2002). It takes another vital step to realise that the 
exchange of honest messages is a special case of communication that is itself a 
form of cooperation. As such, it requires special conditions for emergence (such 
as kinship, byproduct mutualism, group selection, reciprocity – see e.g. Dugatkin 
2002), and generates specific predictions as to its nature (Krebs and Dawkins 
1984). 
Communication in general is constrained by the honesty of signals. Since 
receivers are selected not to respond to dishonest messages – ones that fail to be 
reliably correlated with their “contents” – in the absence of signal honesty 
communication breaks down. Honesty can be guaranteed in two different ways, 
reflecting two models of social interaction. They result in two distinct kinds of 
signalling that characteristically differ in their expensiveness (Krebs and 
Dawkins 1984; see also Noble 2000, who nevertheless generally endorses this 
conclusion). Typically the interests of the individuals and their genes are 
conflicting, and communication spirals into an arms race between “costly 
advertising” and “sales resistance”. Here, honesty of a signal is certified by its 
being expensive and thus difficult to fake. The costs incurred on the signallers 
are diverse and involve minimally the expenditure of valuable resources such as 
time, energy, attention – but they can also include attracting predators, warning 
potential prey, or otherwise handicapping the animal in performing a 
simultaneous action (see also point 4). 
However, in cooperative interactions, honesty is intrinsically present, and 
need not be backed up by signal expensiveness. In such a model, selection 
pressures act against signal expensiveness, favouring the emergence of “cheap” 
signalling. In particular, this is relevant to signalling in language, which follows 
the latter pattern of communicative interactions. 
To sum up, the emergence of language-like communication necessarily 
presupposes the cooperative spectrum of the payoff matrix. Furthermore, it 
strongly predicts the signals used in such a type of communication to minimise 
their conspicuousness as well as all other kinds of costs. 
 
3.    Broadcast transmission 
The concept of broadcast transmission was defined by Hockett (1977) as one of 
the design features of language. The idea of broadcast transmission captures a 
basic trait of verbal communication, which results from its dependence on the 
vocal-auditory transmission channel. Under canonical conditions, a vocal signal 
travels in all directions from its source, its detectability being restricted only by 
the distance from the sender (and the sensory equipment of potential decoders). 
This fact has a number of consequences, but in the present context, it is 
important that a vocally coded message is available indiscriminately to all 
individuals within the hearing range. The signaller is normally unable to confine 
the scope of addressees of its message. 
It is of interest to note that this problem was recognised as early as Hockett 
himself (1977: 131): “The situation is like that in bidding at bridge, where any 
information sent to one's partner is also (barring resort to unannounced 
conventions, which is cheating) transmitted to opponents. There must be many 
ecological conditions in which this public nature of sound is potentially 
contrasurvival.”  
In this respect, gestural communication stands in a clear contrast with vocal 
communication. Its dependence on the visual mode, despite being limiting in 
other ways, does not lead to broadcast transmission, allowing the sender to select 
the addressees of the message. 
4.    The costs of signalling in (proto)language 
Language is a communicative system distinguished by its very high flexibility in 
the range, kind and complexity of transferred messages. This is founded on 
detached representation (Gärdenfors 1996), which affords linguistic 
communication with essential independence from contextual, thematic, etc. 
constraints. This is a qualitative difference from nonlinguistic communication 
systems, and we assume it to be characteristic of protolanguage, at least to a 
considerable extent. The use of conventional signs endows protolanguage, 
despite its limited compositionality/productivity, with the ability to represent 
states, events, relations, etc. in the world in a rich form that can be assigned, or 
at least effectively interpreted in terms of, truth values
2
. 
As stated in point 2, all signalling is costly, principally in ways that are 
directly related to the production of the message, rather than to its “content”. 
                                                          
2 This need not imply an explicitly propositional representation format. For a possible format see 
e.g. Hurford (2006). 
 
Nevertheless, signalling may bear yet another type of consequences that rise to 
prominence in increasingly language-like forms of communication. These 
pertain to the content of the message. In so far as other parties are capable of 
acting on the disclosed information in ways harmful to the signaller, this reduces 
the signaller’s fitness and therefore can be conceptualised as a cost. 
Such costs may be negligible for most kinds of animal communication. This 
changes radically in protolanguage, which enables its users to convey a 
qualitatively different kind of information: rich information about the location 
and ways of access to food and other resources or about the history of social 
interactions (the “who did what to whom”). Such information constitutes 
valuable knowledge, and the evolutionary costs on the individual unintentionally 
divulging it to “eavesdropping” competitors and opponents are proportional to 
its high value. 
It must be especially emphasised that the above constraint is particularly 
relevant to the early stages of the development of language-like communication, 
where the cooperative context of communication is fragile. This is so because – 
as is well known – language introduces or facilitates a range of normative 
mechanisms, such as reciprocity and punishment, that bolster cooperation; 
cooperation and language co-evolve. Therefore, the ability to discriminate 
between the receivers of the message would have been particularly important in 
the “bootstrapping” phase of the emergence of protolanguage.  
5.    The secrecy of gestural signals 
Gestural communication has so far been little studied with respect to signal 
secrecy. However, secrecy resulting from the lack of broadcast transmission 
appears to be a prominent trait of the use of gestures in present day humans. 
When gestural communication occurs between speakers capable of vocal 
communication, it is likely to follow from the effort to constrain the number of 
addressees, and is a strong indicator of a conflict of interests with a third party 
present in the vicinity. A strong link between the use of gestural communication 
under default audibility conditions and the need of secrecy, motivated by a 
conflict of interests, is supported by diverse lines of circumstantial evidence, 
some of which are enumerated below: 
 
 parenthetical signals that qualify, or even contradict, the vocally transmitted 
information, are often designed to be inaccessible to part of the receivers of 
the vocal message  (e.g. a conspiratorial wink accompanying a vocal 
statement) – see Scheflen 1972; 
 
 in contexts involving team competitions, the secrecy of tactical decisions is 
secured by reverting to the gestural mode, e.g. by taking advantage of the 
blocked line of sight of their opponents – see fig. 1; 
 thieves operating in public places are known to depend on gestures to 
coordinate their actions in a manner designed to minimise conspicuousness; 
 indigenous people of the Kalahari Desert resort to sign language during 
hunting; this case represents a markedly different type of secrecy from the 
ones described above: here, the use gestures is not motivated by the 
intention to hide the content of the message but by the intention to hide 
(from prey) the very act of communication. 
 
             
Figure 1. Signals used in a team-competitive context (beach volleyball). 
 
As already noted, secretive use of gestures has not been given attention in 
communication studies. Our work should be seen as a preliminary attempt to 
bridge this gap. Given the speculative nature of our claims, we have designed a 
set of role-play experiments and hope that, in the wake of them, we will be able 
to give these claims a more empirical footing. 
6.    Conclusion 
The argument outlined above is conceptually simple. The specific thesis 
advocated here is that the use of gestures counters the disadvantage incurred by 
the “broadcast transmission” feature characterising vocal communication. We 
suggest that this apparently slight disadvantage becomes magnified in more 
human-like interactions relying on more language-like communication, where 
the cost of divulging valuable information becomes an important factor. The 
gestural mode of communication, making use of the visual channel of 
 
transmission and thus being more secret, allows one to choose the receivers of its 
messages more discriminately. 
The above argument, which can be referred to as the “gestural secrecy 
argument” is limited in its scope. It does not constitute a separate scenario of the 
evolution of protolanguage; rather, it identifies a potentially powerful factor that 
should be included into existing scenarios. Also, the argument does not address 
the central issue of why communication in hominids took a cooperative course in 
the first place. Still, it lends certain support to gestural rather than vocal theories 
of language origins, showing them to be more economical in the above respect. 
Further necessary research includes the incorporation of the factor of signal 
secrecy into more formal modelling of (proto)language origins, as well as 
empirical studies of signal secrecy in present-day gestural communication. 
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